

## Vogtle 2

### 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

---

#### Initiating Events

---

#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

##### **Failure to Adequately Correct EDG TS Surveillance Preconditioning Problem**

Green. A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified for failing to implement adequate corrective actions for unacceptable preconditioning of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) prior to Technical Specification surveillance testing. This preconditioning was identified by the NRC in May 2001 and again in July 2002. Licensee corrective actions were ineffective at preventing recurrence of this condition. This finding was of very low significance because no actual loss of EDG safety function or undetected EDG performance condition actually occurred. The direct cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution (Section 1R22.1).

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

---

#### Barrier Integrity

---

#### Emergency Preparedness

---

#### Occupational Radiation Safety

---

#### Public Radiation Safety

---

#### Physical Protection

**Significance:** SL-IV Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Falsification of Security Access Control System Records**

A Severity Level IV, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for the failure to maintain the results of a drug screening test and the associated entry in the licensee's Access Control System database complete and accurate in that the site Fitness-for-Duty Coordinator deliberately altered information indicating a specimen was negative for drugs when it was, in fact, positive for marijuana and amphetamines. Because this issue involved willfulness on the part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because a barrier was lost in the physical security system in that the failure to properly categorize and report a positive drug test result had the potential to allow unescorted plant access to an individual who did not meet access requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

---

## **Miscellaneous**

**Significance:** N/A Jan 03, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection**

Overall, the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the CAP was low, resulting in a large number of Condition Reports (CRs). Problems entered into the CAP were adequately evaluated and appropriate actions were taken to resolve the problem. Recent events, including two reactor trips during low power feed water operations, and a dual unit shutdown due to secondary chemistry problems, were caused in part by human performance errors combined with weak supervisory oversight. The licensee is currently addressing these common root causes and developing corrective actions. Some instances of missed problem identification were noted. System engineers were found to use the CAP effectively to address equipment issues. Quality Assurance organization audits were effective in identifying issues. Self-assessments were appropriate and findings were entered into the CAP. A safety conscious work environment was found where employees felt free to raise safety issues in CRs or the employee concerns program.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : May 30, 2003